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Abstract Searchable encryption (SE) techniques allow cloud clients to easily store data and search encrypted
data in a privacy-preserving manner, where most of SE schemes treat the cloud server as honest-but-curious.
However, in practice, the cloud server is a semi-honest-but-curious third-party, which only executes a fraction
of search operations and returns a fraction of false search results to save its computational and bandwidth
resources. Thus, it is important to provide a results verification method to guarantee the correctness of the
search results. Existing SE schemes allow multiple data owners to upload different records to the cloud server,
but these schemes have very high computational and storage overheads when applied in a different but more
practical setting where each record is co-owned by multiple data owners. To address this problem, we develop
a verifiable keyword search over encrypted data in multi-owner settings (VKSE-MO) scheme by exploiting the
multisignatures technique. Thus, our scheme only requires a single index for each record and data users are
assured of the correctness of the search results in challenging settings. Our formal security analysis proved that
the VKSE-MO scheme is secure against a chosen-keyword attack under a random oracle model. In addition, our
empirical study using a real-world dataset demonstrated the efficiency and feasibility of the proposed scheme in
practice.
Keywords chosen-keyword attack, efficiency and feasibility, multi-owner settings, result verification, search-
able encryption
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1 Introduction
In the new cloud computing [1] epoch, many cloud clients are attracted to outsourcing data to cloud
service provider (CSP) for storage because of its useful features, such as location-independent resource
pooling and ubiquitous network access. Data outsourcing [2] can relieve data owners (DOs) of the heavy
burden of local data management and maintenance, especially for the storage resource-limited entities
(e.g., mobile terminal devices and sensor nodes). However, data outsourcing actually deprives the DO
of ultimate control over the encrypted data, which may lead to a range of internal and external security
breaches affecting sensitive data. For example, a malicious CSP can forge false search results or an
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Figure 1 Settings considered by various schemes. (a) Settings in our scheme; (b) settings in previous SE schemes.
internal adversary can access sensitive information. Hence, data security and privacy concerns remain
significant barriers to the adoption of cloud storage.
Encryption is considered a straightforward and efficient method for ensuring data security, but it
makes it difficult to retrieve encrypted data from a remote cloud server. A naive solution is to download
the entire encrypted data and decrypt it locally, but this wastes computational and bandwidth resources.
The searchable encryption (SE) technique [3–8] allows data users (DUs) to search securely and selectively
retrieve files of interest according to user-specified keywords, thereby addressing the conflicts between
data privacy and usability, and SE has been studied widely in academic and industrial fields. However, in
practice, CSP is a semi-honest-but-curious third-party that selfishly conducts only a fraction of the search
operations and returns a fraction of false search results to save computational and bandwidth resources.
Thus, the security of data may be at risk due to the various motivations of CSPs (e.g., discarding rarely
accessed data for monetary reasons and hiding data loss incident to maintain the reputation).
Thus, practical SE schemes should be equipped with a results verification mechanism [9–14] to guar-
antee the correctness of the search results. Furthermore, the results verification overheads should be
minimal and affordable in a broad range of practical applications, especially for resource-limited entities.
However, none of the aforementioned SE schemes can be applied in a different but more practical multi-
owner scenario where each record is co-owned by a fixed number of DOs (also called as data-subjects)
rather than there exist multiple DOs contributing different records to CSP, as shown in Figure 1. To
the best of our knowledge, the applications of multiple DOs are quite common in the context of cloud
storage. For example, the contents of each personal health record (PHR) may be controlled by the patient
and various medical staffs. Subsequently, an attending physician may need to access both the patient’s
name and medical records. However, the previously proposed multi-owner schemes [15–17] need to build
multiple indexes for each block of a specific patient’s PHR, which inevitably incurs high computational
and space overheads. It should be noted that each block owned by different data-owners might not be the
same size, and our proposed scheme allows DUs to access the required information without submitting
multiple trapdoors for each PHR entry. The challenging multi-owner setting considered for our proposed
scheme may be excessively rigid, but our scheme can still be applied in the single data-owner settings
without incurring a high computational burden.
To address the problems described above, we propose a secure and efficient cryptographic primitive
called the Verifiable Keyword Search over Encrypted data in the Multi-Owner settings (VKSE-MO)
scheme. Using the multisignatures technique [18] and data auditing technique [19, 20], our scheme can
guarantee data security in challenging settings. Based on a formal security analysis, we prove that our
scheme is secure against chosen-keyword attack in a random oracle model. We also conducted empirical
experiments using a real-world dataset, which demonstrated the feasibility and efficiency of our proposed
scheme in practice. In particular, our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
(1) Supporting challenging multi-owner settings. In contrast to previous SE schemes, our scheme can
be applied in a challenging multi-owner setting where each record is co-owned by multiple DOs.
(2) Supporting result verification. The results verification mechanism allows our scheme to precisely
guarantee the correctness of the search results and to restore the confidence of cloud clients in the overall
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search process.
(3) More secure and practical. First, our secure analysis formally proves that our scheme can resist
chosen-keyword attack in a random oracle model. Second, our experimental results obtained using a
real-world dataset demonstrate its efficiency and feasibility in practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the previous research
related to our scheme. In Section 3, we give the preliminaries associated with our scheme. The system
and threat models, design goals, scheme definition and security model are presented in Section 4. In
Section 5, we describe the detailed construction of our scheme. In Section 6, we present the correctness,
security and performance analyses. Finally, we give our conclusion in Section 7.
2 Related work
SE can achieve data confidentiality and usability, and thus it is very popular with many cloud clients and
it has gradually become a fundamental solution for addressing the problem of secure search over encrypted
data. According to different cryptography primitives, existing SE schemes can be roughly divided into two
categories, e.g., public key SE (PKSE) [21–23] and symmetric SE (SSE) [24–26]. Song et al. [6] proposed
the first SSE scheme, where the search time increases with the size of the data collection. Boneh et
al. [7] constructed a PKSE scheme that providers a stronger security model. Many other SE schemes
with different functionalities have also been proposed, such as conjunctive keyword search [23,27,28] and
ranked keyword search [24,25,29]. Moreover, in these schemes, the CSP is assumed an honest-but-curious
entity that follows the established protocols and that aims to find valuable information.
However, this assumption is usually incorrect in practice because a semi-honest-but-curious CSP may
intentionally return incorrect search results for various reasons. Thus, the data security can be com-
promised and incorrect search results also lead to a poor user search experience. Therefore, a results
verification mechanism should be provided to guarantee the accuracy of the returned results. Hence,
Chai et al. [9] proposed the first verifiable SSE scheme to verify the correctness of the search results.
In addition, the verifiable scheme developed by Zheng et al. [10] using attribute-based encryption can
efficiently grant search capabilities to DUs. However, these schemes only support single keyword search
and they cannot be applied to dynamic databases. Furthermore, Sun et al. [11] proposed a verifiable con-
junctive keyword search method for large dynamic encrypted cloud data. Unfortunately, these schemes
cannot be implemented in challenging multi-owner scenarios where each record is co-owned by multiple
DOs.
Previous SE schemes can be applied in this challenging setting if each block of the record is viewed
as an independent file, but this will inevitably yield multiple indexes where the computational and space
overheads are greatly increased. In the present study, in contrast to previous schemes [15,16], we consider
a multi-owner setting where each record is co-owned by multiple DOs. Layouni et al. [30] considered a
scenario where each message is owned by multiple DOs, and Wang et al. [20] proposed an efficient public
audit verification on the integrity of a multi-owner data scheme. To significantly reduce the time and
space overhead, we extend this type of multi-owner scenario to SE schemes by building a single index
for each whole record. In contrast to previous SE schemes, our proposed scheme can support both
secure search based on keywords and search results verification in challenging multi-owner settings, as
shown in Table 1. Our proposed scheme can significantly reduce the high computational burden imposed
by building multiple indexes in challenging multi-owner settings, as well as improving the user search
experience by ensuring the correctness of the search results.
3 Preliminaries
Let G1, G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, g be a generator of group G1, and e
be the bilinear mapping G1 × G1 → G2. Given a set X , the symbol x ∈R X is defined as choosing
an element x uniformly at random from the set X , and [1, n] is denoted as an integer set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
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Table 1 Comparison of the functionalities of various schemes
Scheme Keyword search Result verification Multi-owner setting
VABKS [10] Yes Yes No
VCKS [11] Yes Yes No
Re-dtPECK [23] Yes No No
ABKS-UR [15] Yes Yes No
VKSE-MO Yes Yes Yes
Let an integer k be the security level and (F ,W) be the file and keyword space, respectively. Next, we
represent a group of cryptographic concepts used in our scheme as follows.
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption). Let G1 be a multiplicative cyclic
group of order p and g be a generator of G1. Given random elements g, g
a, gb ∈R G1, a, b ∈R Z∗p , it is
computationally infeasible to compute gab ∈R G1 for any probabilistic time adversary A with a negligible
advantage ǫ, where the advantage of A is defined as Pr[ACDH(g, g
a, gb) = gab] 6 ǫ.
Definition 2 (Decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption). Given the bilinear map param-
eters (G1, G2, p, g, e) and elements a, b, c, z ∈R Z∗p , the DBDH assumption states that no probabilistic
time adversary A can distinguish the tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) from the tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z)
with a non-negligible advantage, where the advantage of adversary A is defined as AdvDBDHA (1
k) =
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1] − Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) = 1]|. Then we say that the DBDH as-
sumption relative to the generatorG1 holds if the advantage Adv
DBDH
A (1
k) is negligible for all probabilistic
time adversaries.
Definition 3 (Truncated q-augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (q-ABDHE) assumption). Given
the bilinear map parameters (G1, G2, p, g, e), a polynomial q = q(k), and elements a
′, b′, c′ ∈R Z∗p , the
truncated q-ABDHE assumption states that no probabilistic time adversary A can distinguish the tu-
ple (g, ga
′
, . . . , ga
′q
, gb
′
, gb
′a′q+2 , e(g, g)b
′a′q+1 ) from tuple (g, ga
′
, . . . , ga
′q
, gb
′
, gb
′a′q+2 , e(g, g)c
′
), where the
advantage of adversary A is set as Advq−ABDHEA (1
k) = |Pr[A(g, ga
′
, . . . , ga
′q
, gb
′
, gb
′a′q+2 , e(g, g)b
′a′q+1 ) =
1]−Pr[A(g, ga
′
, . . . , ga
′q
, gb
′
, gb
′a′q+2 , e(g, g)c
′
) = 1]| and is non-negligible. Then, the truncated q-ABDHE
assumption relative to the generator G1 holds if the advantage Adv
q−ABDHE
A (1
k) is negligible for all
probabilistic time adversaries.
4 Problem formulation
To better understand our scheme, the terms search token (trapdoor) and file (record) are both used
interchangeably throughout this study.
4.1 System and threat models
In this study, our scheme considers a cloud data storage system that mainly involves four entities, i.e., a
CSP, multiple DOs, DU and private audit server (PAS), as shown in Figure 2. DOs upload indexes and
signatures to CSP. The authorized DU issues search queries by submitting search tokens to CSP, PAS is
responsible for verifying the correctness of the search results before returning them to the DU. CSP offers
data storage and retrieval services to cloud clients (including DOs and DU). Note that the encryption
of each record is achieved using the traditional public key encryption algorithm, which is outside the
scope of our current discussion. Furthermore, the system initialization parameters and secret keys are
generated by a fully trusted third-party, and we omit details of this process from the present study.
A fully credible PAS honestly ensures the accuracy of search results. Similar to the previous verifiable
SE scheme, CSP is considered to be semi-honest-but-curious. We also assume that only the authorized
DUs can issue search queries over encrypted data.
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Figure 2 (Color online) System model of our scheme.
4.2 Design goals
In this section, we describe the design goals needed to guarantee the security and efficiency of our scheme
as follows.
(1) Data security. To guarantee data security, sensitive data should be encrypted before outsourcing to
a CSP. There should also be a results verification mechanism to be furnished to guarantee the correctness
of the search results provided by the semi-trusted CSP.
(2) Feasibility and efficiency. To enhance its feasibility and practicality in real-world applications, our
scheme should not incur a high computational burden in challenging multi-owner settings.
(3) Security goals. To address security concerns, our scheme should guarantee data security and privacy.
Furthermore, our scheme should resist chosen-keyword attacks under a random oracle model.
4.3 Solution framework and security model
Our scheme is a tuple of six algorithms (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Trap,Search,Verify), which are described
as follows.
(1) Setup(1k). Given the security parameter k, this deterministic algorithm outputs the global pa-
rameters GP and the public/secret key pair (PK,SK) for the traditional public key algorithm.
(2) KeyGen(GP ,CSP,O,U). After inputting GP, this probabilistic algorithm outputs the pub-
lic/secret key pairs of (pkOt , skOt), (pku, sku), and (pkS , skS) for each DO (Ot ∈ O, 1 6 t 6 s), a
specified DU (u ∈ U), and CSP, respectively.
(3) Enc(GP ,PK, F,W, ID, skOt , pkS , pku). For the file set F and keyword set W , the DOs first run
this algorithm to generate the ciphertext set C = {ci} and index set I = {Iw}, before each DO (Ot)
generates the signature sigt,i for each ciphertext ci ∈ C, where 1 6 i 6 n, 1 6 t 6 s, w ∈W .
(4) Trap(GP , w′, sku). Given the keyword w′, a specific DU (u) performs this probabilistic algorithm
to output the trapdoor Tw′ utilizing the secret key sku, where u ∈ U .
(5) Search(GP , Tw′, C, I, pkS , skS). Using the trapdoor Tw′ as an input, the CSP first matches it with
the index set I, then returns the relevant encrypted records C′w′ ⊆ C to PAS.
(6) Verify(GP , Sig, C′w′ , pkOt). After receiving the returned results C
′
w′ , PAS needs to verify the
correctness of the search results by interacting with CSP. If C′w′ passes the result verification, then PAS
accepts it and sends it to DU (u); otherwise, PAS rejects it.
In the following, we provide the security definition for our scheme according to a similar definition
given for a previous scheme [7]. Our scheme can resist chosen-keyword attacks by two types of attackers
represented as Game 1 and Game 2, respectively. In particular, the CSP cannot distinguish that a
certain index is encrypted by a specific keyword. In addition, without the private key of CSP, an outside
attacker cannot make a decision about whether the indexes match with the trapdoor. Next, we describe
the chosen-keyword attack games in Definition 4.
Definition 4 (IND-CKA game). Let an integer k be the security level and A be an adversary, and we
present the indistinguishability against chosen-keyword attack (IND-CKA) game between adversary A
and simulator B.
First, we assume that A is the CSP, and Game 1 is presented as follows.
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Table 2 Notation definitions
Symbol Description Symbol Description
F = {fi}16i6n Data file set Tw′ Trapdoor for w
′ ∈ W
ID = {idi}16i6n Identity set for F C
′
w′
= {c′j}16j6#Cw′ Results containing w
′ ∈ W
C = {ci}16i6n Ciphertext set for F #C
′
w′
Number of ciphertext in C′
w′
W = {wj}16j6m Keyword set ID
′
w′
= {id′j}16j6#C′
w′
Identity set of C′
w′
Iw Index for w ∈ W Sig = {sigi}16i6n Signature set for F
I Index set for W sigi = {sigt,i}16t6s DOs’ signature set for fi
(1) Setup. Given the security parameter k, B first simulates the Setup and KeyGen algorithms to
generate the global parameters GP , and the public/secret key pairs {(pkS , skS), (pku, sku)} for the CSP
and specific DU (u), respectively. Then, B sends {pkS , skS , pku} to A.
(2) Phase 1. A issues a number of search queries to the Trap oracle as follows.
• Trap. B first performs the Trap algorithm for each keyword w′ ∈ W to generate the search token
Tw′ , and then responses to A’s search queries.
(3) Challenge. After the Phase 1, A selects two target keywords w0, w1 on which to be challenged,
where it requires that both keywords w0, w1 were not been queried in Phase 1. After receiving these
keywords, B responds to A by selecting a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. In addition, B generates the indexes
{Twb} for the target keyword wb and sends them to A.
(4) Phase 2. A issues a number of search queries, as in Phase 1. The only restriction here is that the
target keywords w0, w1 cannot be used to query the Trap oracle.
(5) Guess. A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b′.
A’s advantage when resisting the attack in Game 1 is denoted as AdvGame 1IND-CKA,A(1
k) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
Next, we assume that A is the outside attacker, and Game 2 is described as follows.
(1) Setup. Using the security parameter k as an input, B first performs the Setup and KeyGen
algorithms to output the global parameters GP , and the public/secret key pairs {(pkS , skS), (pku, sku)}
for the CSP and specific DU (u), respectively. Then, B sends {pkS , skS , pku} to A.
(2) Challenge. A outputs two target keywords w0, w1 on which to be challenged, and B responds by
selecting a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, B generates the search token {Twb} for the target keyword wb
and sends it to A.
(3) Guess. A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b′.
Then, A’s advantage when resisting the attack in Game 2 is defined as AdvGame 2IND−CKA,A(1
k) = |Pr[b′ =
b]− 12 |. Therefore, our scheme is IND-CKA secure if Adv
Game i
IND−CKA,A(1
k) = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | is negligible,
where i ∈ {1, 2}.
5 Proposed VKSE-MO scheme
In this section, we mainly focus on building indexes and generating signatures, whereas the file encryption
process is beyond the scope of our discussion. Before describing the construction of our scheme, we first
introduce some notations in Table 2.
Next, we describe the concrete construction of our scheme as follows.
Setup(1k). Given a security parameter k, this deterministic algorithm first outputs the bilinear map
parameters (G1, G2, e, p, g). Then, it chooses two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ →R G1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ →R Z∗p
and generates the public/secret key pair (PK, SK) for the traditional public key encryption algorithm
in order to encrypt/decrypt records, respectively. Finally, it publishes the global parameters GP =
{G1, G2, e, p, g,H1, H2,PK}, where the secret key SK is shared among authorized cloud clients.
GP = {G1, G2, e, p, g,H1, H2,PK}. (1)
KeyGen(GP ,CSP,O,U). Run the probabilistic algorithm to generate public/secret key pairs for cloud
clients (including the DO set O and authorized DU set U) and CSP. For each DO (Ot ∈ O|1 6 t 6 s),
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Keyword extracting Index generating
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Figure 3 Example of an index structure.
this algorithm chooses elements xt, yt ∈R Z
∗
p , at ∈R G1 and calculates g
xt , gyt ∈R G1, before defining the
public/secret key pair of DO (Ot) as pkOt = (at, g
xt , gyt), skOt = (xt, yt). In addition, for each authorized
DU (u ∈ U), this algorithm sets the public/secret key pair of DU (u) as pku = (a, g
y), sku = y, which
is similar to the key generation of DO, where y ∈R Z∗p , a ∈R G1. For the CSP, this algorithm chooses
elements z ∈R Z∗p , b ∈R G1 and computes g
z ∈R G1 before outputting the public/secret key pair of CSP
as pkS = (g
z, b), skS = z.
(pkOt , skOt) = {(at, g
xt , gyt), (xt, yt)}; (pku, sku) = {(a, g
y), y}; (pkS , skS) = {(g
z, b), z}. (2)
Enc(GP ,PK, F,W, ID, skOt , pkS , pku). This probabilistic algorithm first encrypts the file set F as
ciphertext set C utilizing public key PK. For the ciphertext set {ci ∈ C|1 6 i 6 n} and corre-
sponding identity set {idi}16i6n, each DO (Ot|1 6 t 6 s) generates the signature sigt,i for ci as
sigt,i = (H1(idi)g
H2(ci))xt , and the signatures for ci are then set as sigi = {sig1,i, . . . , sigs,i}. Before
building the index Iw for each keyword w ∈ W , it first selects elements α, β ∈R Z∗p and computes
I1 = g
α, γ = H2(e(g
z, b)α), I2 = (g
yg−w)β/γ , I3 = e(g, g)
β, I4 = e(g, a)
β, then sends the signature set
Sig = {sig1, . . . , sign} for file set F , index set I = {Iw|w ∈ W} for keyword set W , and ciphertext set
C to CSP, where Iw = {I1, I2, I3, I4}, w ∈R Z
∗
p . Next, we provide an example of an index structure in
Figure 3, which comprises five files and three keywords. For details of the specific encryption process,
please refer to the Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Ciphertext generation algorithm
Input: File set F = {fi}16i6n, identity set ID = {idi}16i6n , keyword set W = {wj}16j6m ;
Output: Ciphertext set C, signature set Sig, index set I.
1: Given skOt ,pkS ,pku,PK;
2: for 1 6 i 6 n do
3: Encrypt fi as ci using PK; /∗ use the public key PK ∗/
4: Generate signature sigi for fi; /∗ use the secret keys {skOt} of multiple DOs ∗/
5: end for
6: Return Ciphertext set C = {ci, . . . , cn}, signature set Sig = {sig1, . . . , sign};
7: for 1 6 j 6 m do
8: Build index Iwj = {I1, I2, I3, I4}; /∗ use the public keys (pkS ,pku) of cloud server and DU ∗/
9: end for
10: Return index set I = {Iw1 , . . . , Iwm};
11: Send (C, I,Sig) to CSP.
Trap(GP , w′, sku). A specific DU (u) conducts this probabilistic algorithm to generate a search token
for keyword w′ by first selecting an element θ ∈R Z∗p and setting Tw′,1 = θ, Tw′,2 = (ag
−θ)1/(y−w
′) before
submitting the search token Tw′ = {Tw′,1, Tw′,2} to CSP.
Tw′ = {θ, (ag
−θ)1/(y−w
′)}. (3)
Search(GP , Tw′ , C, I, pkS , skS). This deterministic algorithm is performed by CSP. It first computes
γ′ = H2(e(I1, b)
z) = H2(e(g
α, b)z), then checks whether Eq. (4) holds or not.
e(Iγ
′
2 , Tw′,2)I
Tw′,1
3 = I4. (4)
If Eq. (4) holds, CSP returns the relevant ciphertext set C′w′ = {c
′
j}16j6#C′w′ and the corresponding
identity set ID′w′ = {id
′
j}16j6#C′
w′
to PAS; otherwise, it returns ⊥. The specific search process is shown
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Algorithm 2 Ciphertext search algorithm
Input: Search token Tw′ = {Tw′ ,1, Tw′,2}, index set I = {Iw|w ∈ W}, public/secret key pair (pkS , skS), ciphertext set
C = {ci}16i6n ;
Output: Search results C′
w′
and corresponding identity set ID′
w′
.
1: Index Iwj = {I1, I2, I3, I4} for each keyword wj ∈ W ;
2: for 1 6 j 6 m do
3: Compute γ′ = H2(e(I1, b)z);
4: Check e(Iγ
′
2 , Tw′ ,2)I
Tw′,1
3
?
= I4 (1);
5: if Eq. (1) holds then
6: Output Cwj = C
′
w′
, IDwj = ID
′
w′
; /∗ Eq. (1) holds, then wj = w′ ∗/
7: else
8: Output ⊥;
9: end if
10: end for
11: Return C′
w′
= {c′j}16j6#C′
w′
, ID′
w′
= {id′j}16j6#C′
w′
; /∗ Return the ciphertext that contains w′ ∗/
12: Send C′
w′
, ID′
w′
to PAS.
in the Algorithm 2. First, CSP matches the trapdoor Tw′ with every keyword wj ∈ W (1 6 j 6 m)
(Lines 2–10). Next, it returns the matched results C′w′ and corresponding identity set ID
′
w′ to the PAS.
Verify(GP , Sig, Cw′ , pkOt). After receiving the returned results C
′
w′ , PAS starts to verify the correct-
ness of C′w′ in order to ensure the data security. First, it chooses the elements τ1, . . . , τ#C′w′ ∈R Z
∗
p , then
sends the information {j, τj}j∈[1,#C′
w′
] to CSP. Finally, the CSP returns the proof information as follows.
• Step 1. It first computes µ =
∑#C′
w′
j=1 τjH2(c
′
j), where c
′
j ∈ C
′
w′ .
• Step 2. Then, it computes ν =
∏#C′
w′
j=1 (sig
′
j)
τj , where sig′j =
∏s
t=1 sig
′
t,j , sig
′
t,j = (H1(id
′
j)g
H2(c
′
j))xt .
• Step 3. Finally, it returns {µ, ν, id′j∈[1,#C′
w′
]} to PAS.
After PAS obtains the proof information, it tests whether Eq. (5) holds,
e(ν, g) = e

#C
′
w′∏
j=1
H1(id
′
j)
τj · gµ,
s∏
t=1
gxt

 . (5)
If Eq. (5) holds, then it returns C′w′ to DU (u); otherwise, it rejects the search results and returns ⊥. After
obtaining the search results, DU can decrypt them using the key SK. The detailed results verification is
given in the Algorithm 3. First, CSP sends the proof information {µ, ν} to PAS (Lines 2–5). Next, PAS
verifies whether the search results C′w′ are correct or not (Lines 6–16).
Remark. In our scheme, CSP returns the relevant ciphertext to DU when the submitted search
token matches with the indexes, as shown in Eq. (4). CSP can honestly follow the established protocols
to return relevant results, but guaranteeing whether CSP has tampered with or forged the encrypted
records remains a challenge. To ensure the security of the data, our proposed VKSE-MO scheme use a
verification mechanism to check the correctness of the returned results with Eq. (5).
6 Analysis of VKSE-MO scheme
6.1 Correctness
In this section, we show the correctness of our scheme if the aforementioned Eqs. (4) and (5) hold.
When the submitted search token matches with the index (namely, w′ = w), DU can obtain the
required records. For Eq. (4), we first have
γ′ = H2(e(I1, b)
z) = H2(e(g
α, b)z) = H2(e(g
z, b)α) = γ.
Then we obtain
e(Iγ
′
2 , Tw′,2) = e((g
yg−w)βγ
′/γ , (ag−θ)1/(y−w
′)) = e(g(y−w)β, (ag−θ)1/(y−w
′)) = e(g, a)βe(g, g)−βθ,
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Algorithm 3 Results verification algorithm
Input: Signature set Sig = {sig1, . . . , sign}, search results C
′
w′
= {c′j}16j6#C′
w′
, identity set ID′
w′
= {id′j}16j6#C′
w′
;
Output: “Accept” or “Reject”.
1: Send challenge information {τj}16j6#C′
w′
to CSP;
2: for 1 6 j 6 #C′
w′
do
3: Compute µ =
∑#C′
w′
j=1
τjH2(c′j);
4: Compute ν =
∏#C′
w′
j=1
(sig′j)
τj ;
5: Send {µ, ν} to PAS; /∗ Proof information returned by cloud server ∗/
6: Compute
∏#C′
w′
j=1 H1(id
′
j)
τj ;
7: end for
8: for 1 6 t 6 s do
9: Compute
∏s
t=1 g
xt ;
10: end for
11: Check e(ν, g)
?
= e(
∏#C′
w′
j=1 H1(id
′
j)
τj · gµ,
∏s
t=1 g
xt) (2);
12: if Eq. (2) holds then
13: Output “Accept”; /∗ Cloud server returns the correct search results ∗/
14: else
15: Output “Reject”; /∗ Cloud server returns the false search results ∗/
16: end if
17: Send the correct search results to DU.
I
Tw′,1
3 = (e(g, g)
β)θ = e(g, g)βθ.
Finally, we can check the correctness of Eq. (4) when w′ = w, as follows:
e(Iγ
′
2 , Tw′,2)I
Tw′,1
3 = e(g, a)
βe(g, g)−βθe(g, g)βθ = e(g, a)β = I4.
For Eq. (5), we have
e(ν, g) = e

#C
′
w′∏
j=1
(sig′j)
τj , g

 = e

#C
′
w′∏
j=1
(
s∏
t=1
sig′t,j
)τj
, g

 = e

#C
′
w′∏
j=1
s∏
t=1
(H1(id
′
j)g
H2(c
′
j))xtτj , g


= e

#C
′
w′∏
j=1
(H1(id
′
j))
τjgH2(c
′
j)τj ,
s∏
t=1
gxt

 = e

#C
′
w′∏
j=1
(H1(id
′
j))
τj · g
∑#C′
w′
j=1 H2(c
′
j)τj ,
s∏
t=1
gxt


= e

#C
′
w′∏
j=1
(H1(id
′
j))
τj · gµ,
s∏
t=1
gxt

 .
Thus, we can verify that the Eq. (5) holds.
6.2 Security
In terms of security, we formally prove the security property of our scheme and show that it meets the
design goals. The security of our scheme can be guaranteed by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Theorem 1
can guarantee data confidentiality by proving that our proposed scheme can resist the chosen-keyword
attack considered by most of existing SE schemes. Theorem 2 can protect data security by checking the
correctness of the search results.
Theorem 1. Our scheme is IND-CKA (indistinguishability against chosen-keyword attack) secure under
a random oracle model given that DBDH problem and q-ABDHE problem are intractable.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. Our scheme is secure against IND-CKA in Game 1 under a random oracle model given that
q-ABDHE problem is intractable. Where q > ψk, ψk is denoted as the number of search token queries.
Proof. Let A be a polynomial-time adversary that can attack our scheme in Game 1 under a random
oracle model, and A’s advantage when attacking our scheme is ǫ, and ψk is the number of search token
queries. Then, we can build a simulator B that plays the q-ABDHE game as follows.
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Assuming that the bilinear parameters (G1, G2, e, g) are first set by the challenger, then B outputs a
q-ABDHE instance (g, ga
′
, . . . , ga
′q
, gb
′
, gb
′a′q+2 , φ). Finally, B needs to distinguish φ = e(g, g)b
′a′q+1 from
a random element in G2.
(1) Setup. Given a security parameter k, B first outputs GP = {G1, G2, e, p, g,H2,W}, where H2 :
{0, 1}∗ →R Z∗p is a hash function, and W ∈R Z
∗
p is the keyword space. Then he selects two elements
z ∈R Z∗p , b ∈R G1, sets pkS = (̟, b), skS = z as the CSP’s public key and private key, respectively, where
̟ = gz. In addition, B chooses a random degree q polynomial f(̟) and defines pku = (g
a′ , a) as the
public key of DU (u), where a = gf(a
′). Finally, B sends (pkS , skS , pku) to A.
(2) Query phase 1. A issues the search token queries as follows.
Step 1. A uses the keyword w∗ to query the Trap oracle.
Step 2. B sets Tw∗,1 = f(w∗) and computes Tw∗,2 = g(f(a
′)−f(w∗))/(a′−w∗).
Step 3. B sends Tw∗ = (Tw∗,1, Tw∗,2) to A. Note that Tw∗,1 is a random element from the viewpoint
of A when q > ψk beacuse f(̟) is a random degree q polynomial.
(3) Challenge. When the Query phase 1 is over, A submits two target keywords w∗0 , w
∗
1 , and B responds
according to the following steps.
Step 1. B first selects a random bit ̺ ∈ {0, 1} and sets Tw∗̺,1 = fk(w
∗
̺). Next, B computes Tw∗̺,2 =
g(f(a
′)−f(w∗̺))/(a
′−w∗̺).
Step 2. B selects an element α∗ ∈R Z∗p and computes I
∗
1 = g
α∗ , γ∗ = H2(e(̟, b)
α∗).
Step 3. B first defines the degree q + 1 polynomial F ∗(̟) = (̟q+2 − (w∗̺)
q+2)/(̟ − w∗̺) =∑q+1
i=0 (F
∗
i ̟
i), and then computes I∗2 = (g
b′a′q+2(gb
′
)−(w
∗
̺)
q+2
)1/γ
∗
, I∗3 = φ
F∗q+1e(gb
′
,
∏q
i=0(g
a′i)F
∗
i ), I∗4 =
e((I∗2 )
γ∗ , Tw∗̺,2)(I
∗
3 )
Tw∗̺,1 . Finally, the index I∗ = (I∗1 , I
∗
2 , I
∗
3 , I
∗
4 ) is sent to A. Set β
∗ = b′F ∗(a′), and
if φ = e(g, g)b
′a′q+1 , then I∗2 = g
(a′−w∗̺)(b
′(a′q+2−(w∗̺)
q+2)/(a′−w∗̺))1/γ
∗
= g(a
′−w∗̺)φ/γ
∗
, I∗3 = e(g, g)
β∗,
I∗4 = e(g, a)
β∗ .
(4) Query phase 2. A issues search queries as the processes in Query phase 1.
(5) Guess. A returns the guess bit ̺′ ∈ {0, 1}, and if ̺′ = ̺, then B outputs 1 to show that φ =
e(g, g)b
′a′q+1 ; otherwise, B outputs 0 to show that φ = e(g, g)β.
If the equation φ = e(g, g)b
′a′q+1 holds, then A can accurately guess the bit ̺ with an advantage 12 + ǫ;
otherwise, φ is a random element in G1, the tuple (I
∗
2 , I
∗
3 ) is a random and independent element, and
the inequality I∗3 6= e(g, (I
∗
2 )
γ∗)1/(a
′−w∗̺) holds with an advantage 1− 1p . If the inequality holds, then the
value of I∗4 = e((I
∗
2 )
γ∗ , a1/(a
′−w∗̺))(I∗3/e(g, (I
∗
2 )
γ∗)1/(a
′−w∗̺))
Tw∗̺,1 is uniformly random and independent
from the viewpoint of A (except for the value I∗4 ) because Tw∗̺,1 is a random and independent element
from the viewponit of A (except for the value I∗3 ) when q > ψk, Tw∗̺,1 = f(w
∗
̺). In addition, as α
∗ is
an element in RZ
∗
p , so I
∗
1 = g
α∗ is uniformly random and independent of (I∗2 , I
∗
3 , I
∗
4 ). Thus, the tuple
(I∗1 , I
∗
2 , I
∗
3 , I
∗
4 ) leaks no valuable information regarding the bit ̺. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Our scheme is secure against IND-CKA in Game 2 under a random oracle model given that
DBDH problem is intractable.
Proof. Let A be a polynomial-time adversary which can attack our scheme in Game 2 under a random
oracle model, then we build a simulator B to play the DBDH game as follows.
Given the bilinear map parameters (G1, G2, p, e, g), B outputs a DBDH tuple (g, ga
′
, gb
′
, gc
′
, φ), and
must then determine whether φ = e(g, g)a
′b′c′ or an element in RG2.
(1) Setup. After inputting the security parameter k, output the parameters GP = (G1, G2, p, e, g,H2,
W), where H2 : {0, 1}∗ →R Z∗p is a hash function and W ∈R Z
∗
p is the keyword space. B first sets
gz = ga
′
, b = gb
′
and denotes the public key of CSP as pkS = (g
z, b) before selecting two elements
y ∈R Z∗p , a ∈R G1 and denoting the public key and private key of DU (u) as pku = (g
y, a), sku = y,
respectively. Finally, B sends the parameters (pkS , pku, sku) to A.
(2) Challenge. A issues two target keywords w′0, w
′
1 and B responds it with the following steps.
Step 1. B first outputs a random bit ̺ ∈ {0, 1} and computes I∗1 = g
c′ , γ∗ = H2(φ).
Step 2. Then, B chooses β∗ ∈R Z∗p and computes I
∗
2 = (g
yg−w
′
̺)β
∗/γ∗ , I∗3 = e(g, g)
β∗ , I∗4 = e(g, a)
β∗ .
Step 3. Finally, B sends the index I∗ = (I∗1 , I
∗
2 , I
∗
3 , I
∗
4 ) to A.
Miao Y B, et al. Sci China Inf Sci December 2017 Vol. 60 122105:11
(3) Guess. A returns the guess bit ̺′, and if ̺′ = ̺, then B outputs 1 meaning φ = e(g, g)a
′b′c′ ;
otherwise, B outputs 0 and thus φ = e(g, g)β
∗
.
Assuming that A has an advantage ǫ when breaking our scheme under a random oracle model, then
the probability of B is shown as follows.
If the equation φ = e(g, g)a
′b′c′ holds, then the advantage of A satisfies |Pr[̺′ = ̺] − 1w | > ǫ. If φ is
uniformly random in G2, then Pr[̺
′ = ̺] = 12 . Thus, we can find that |Pr[B(g, g
a′, gb
′
, gc
′
, e(g, g)a
′b′c′) =
1]− Pr[B(g, ga
′
, gb
′
, gc
′
, e(g, g)β
∗
) = 1]| > |(12 ± ǫ)−
1
2 | when a
′, b′, c′ are uniformly random in Z∗p and φ
is uniformly random in G2. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
The analysis above completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. For a semi-trusted CSP, it is computationally infeasible to forge a valid result verification
proof for adversary A under the CDH and DL assumptions.
Proof. To the best of our knowledge, A can forge a valid results verification proof using one of the
following two methods:
(1) First, assuming that A can forge a valid multisignature based on each encrypted record, then he
can forge a valid result verification proof based on the forged multisignatures using the ciphertext set. By
contrast, if A can generate a valid forgery, then we can solve the CDH problem in G1, which contradicts
the CDH assumption. Moreover, although A can corrupt with up to (s − 1) DOs and independently
forge their corresponding public/secret key pairs, it is still computationally infeasible to forge a valid
multisignature, as proved previously [20]. Thus, it is infeasible to forge a valid result verification via this
way.
(2) Second, A is able to directly forge the valid result verification proof based on the whole ciphertext
set if he breaks the following security game.
We present the details of security game as follows.
Step 1. First, PAS sends the challenge information {j, τj}j∈[1,#C′
w′
] to the CSP, and CSP should
return the proof information {µ, ν, id′j∈[1,#C′
w′
]} based on the correct encrypted data C
′
w′ . In addition, A
outputs the forgery of the result verification proof information {µ′, ν, id′′j∈[1,#C′′
w′
]} based on the corrupted
C′′w′ , where µ
′ =
∑#C′′
w′
j=1 τjH2(c
′′
j ), c
′′
j ∈ C
′′
w′ , j ∈ [1,#C
′′
w′ ] and C
′′
w′ 6= C
′
w′ .
Step 2. Second, if we let △µ = µ′ − µ(△µ 6= 0), then we can say that A may successfully win
the game if the forged proof information {µ′, ν, id′′j∈[1,#C′′
w′
]} can pass the result verification mechanism;
otherwise, he fails. Suppose thatA wins the security game, then we can have e(ν, g) = e(
∏#C′′
w′
j=1 H1(id
′′
j )
τj ·
gµ
′
,
∏s
t=1 g
xt). We also obtain e(ν, g) = e(
∏#C′
w′
j=1 H1(id
′
j)
τj · gµ,
∏s
t=1 g
xt) according to the valid result
verification proof information {µ, ν, id′j∈[1,#C′
w′
]}. Therefore, we further have g
µ′ = gµ, g△µ = 1.
Given two elements ̟1, ̟2 ∈R G1, then a certain element x ∈R Z∗p exists such that ̟2 = ̟
x
1 because
G1 is a multiplicative cyclic group. Without any loss of generality, the generator g can be expressed as
g = ̟λ11 ̟
λ2
2 , where λ1, λ2 ∈R Z
∗
p . Thus, we can have the following equation:
(̟λ11 ̟
λ2
2 )
△µ = 1⇐⇒ ̟λ1△µ1 ̟
λ2△µ
2 = 1.
Step 3. Based on the Step 2, a solution exists to the DL problem (given g, ga
′
∈R G1, output a′ ∈R Z∗p ).
Given ̟1, ̟
x
1 , we can deduce that ̟2 = ̟
−
λ1△µ
λ2△µ
1 = ̟
x
1 , x = −
λ1△µ
λ2△µ
provided that λ2 △ µ 6= 0. As
mentioned above, △µ 6= 0 and λ2 is a random element in Z∗p , the probability of △µ 6= 0 is 1 −
1
p . In
other words, we can solve the DL problem if A breaks the security game, which contradicts to the DL
assumption. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
6.3 Performance
In this section, we present the performance evaluations of our scheme in terms of its computational
complexity and its actual performance using a real-world dataset. The experiments were implemented
on an Ubuntu 15.04 Server with an Intel Core i5 processor running at 2.3 GHz using C and the Paring
Based Cryptography (PBC) Library. In the PBC Library, Type A is denoted as E(Fq) : y
2 = x3 + x,
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Table 3 Computational complexity of different algorithms in the two schemes
Different algorithm VKSE-MO scheme ABKS-UR [15] scheme
KeyGen (2s+ 1 + |U|)E (2|U|+ 2|N |+ 1)E
Enc (2m + 2n+ 4)E + nOH1 + 3P n(|N |+ 2)E
Trap (R + 1)E (2|N |+ 1)E
Search (2 + R)E + (1 +R)P (|N |+ 1)P + E
Verify (1 + #C′
w′
)E + 2P +#C′
w′
OH1 Not considerated
G1 is a subgroup of E(Fq), and the cyclic group is a subgroup of E(Fq)
2, where q is a large prime
number. The group order of G1 is 160-bit and the base field is 512-bit. In terms of the computational
complexity, we mainly considered several computational operations such as the exponentiation operation
(E) in group G1, pairing operation (P ), and hash operation (OH1) which maps a bit string to element
in G1. In Table 3, we present the computational overheads of our scheme compared with the state-of-
the-art ABKS-UR scheme [15] which is based on the attribute-based encryption [31], where |U| denotes
the number of DUs, |N | is the number of attributes in system, and R denotes the number of keywords
submitted. In the comparison, we set s ∈ [1, 10], |U| ∈ [1, 50], R ∈ [1, 50], |N | = 100, #Cw′ ∈ [1, 100],
m ∈ [1, 1000], and n ∈ [1, 10000].
Table 3 shows that our scheme is more efficient than the ABKS-UR scheme with respect to the Key-
Gen, Enc, Trap, Search algorithms but not the verify algorithm. Apparently, our scheme has lower
computational costs than the ABKS-UR scheme for the Trap and Search algorithms because R≪ |N|,
where |N | denotes the number of total attributes in system and R is the number of keywords submitted
in a single search query. For the KeyGen algorithm, the ABKS-UR scheme and our scheme require
2|U|E, |U|E for DUs, respectively. Furthermore, in practice, s ≪ |N|. Thus, our scheme is more effi-
cient than the ABKS-UR scheme when considering the KeyGen algorithm. For the Enc algorithm, the
ABKS-UR scheme needs |N |E for each record. When encrypting the total records, the ABKS-UR scheme
needs n|N |E, whereas our scheme only needs (2m + 2n + 4)E + nOH
1
. Therefore, ABKS-UR incurs a
greater computational burden than our scheme for the Enc algorithm. To the best of our knowledge,
the ABKS-UR scheme cannot accurately verify the correctness of search results because the false positive
rate caused by the Bloom Filter will incur high communication overheads. Thus, the verify algorithm
in the ABKS-UR scheme is outside the scope of our discussion.
We also conducted an empirical study using a real-world dataset, where we employed the Enron email
dataset1) containing half million records from 150 users in order to assess the actual performance of the
aforementioned schemes. For convenience, we randomly selected 10000 records (n = 10000) from this
dataset and performed the experiments 100 times, where we set the number of keywords asW ∈ [1, 1000].
As shown in Figure 4, we first analyzed the key generation time by varying the number of DUs
(|U| ∈ [1, 50]), where we found that the computational overheads of KeyGen algorithm in both schemes
increase almost linearly with the value of |U| when we set |N | = 100, s = 1, 5, 10, respectively. The ABKS-
UR scheme requires two exponentiation operations for each DU and multiple operations for attribute set
N , whereas our scheme only needs one for each DU. Thus, our scheme outperformed the ABKS-UR
scheme in terms of KeyGen algorithm. In addition, the computational cost of our scheme increased
for the KeyGen algorithm when we increased the value from s ∈ [1, 10]. In practical applications, the
number of DOs for each record is much less than |U|, so our scheme is more efficient than the ABKS-UR
scheme.
As shown in Figure 5, we evaluated the computational burden of the Enc algorithm in both schemes
by varying the number of records from 1 to 10000 (n ∈ [1, 10000]). Obviously, the computational costs of
the two schemes increased with the value of n when we set |N | = 100, m = 100, 500, 1000, respectively.
The ABKS-UR scheme requires |N | exponentiation operations for each record, so its computational cost
is proportional to the value of n, whereas that of our scheme only needs two exponentiation operations
and one hash operation OH1 . Our scheme needs to encrypt keywords, but it does not incur additional
overheads when the value of m increases because the hash operation OH2 is much more efficient than
1) http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ enron/.
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Figure 4 (Color online) KeyGen algorithm. Figure 5 (Color online) Enc algorithm.
(a) (b)
Figure 6 (Color online) Computational costs. (a) Trap algorithm; (b) Search algorithm.
other operations. Therefore, our scheme was much more efficient than the ABKS-UR scheme in Enc
algorithm. In addition, the Enc algorithm does not affect the user search experience because it is only
performed only in the initialization of the system. Thus, our scheme is still acceptable in practice.
As shown in Figure 6(a), the computational overheads of the Trap algorithm in our scheme depend
mainly on the number of keywords (R ∈ [1, 50]) submitted, whereas those in the ABKS-UR scheme are
affected by the factor |N |. For comparison, we set |N | = 100 and varied the value of R from 1 to 50 in
this algorithm. The computational overheads of our scheme increased almost linearly with R, whereas
those of the ABKS-UR scheme remained almost unchanged. Our scheme had much lower computational
overheads in terms of the trapdoor generation time than the ABKS-UR scheme when we set R ≪ |N|
in practice. Similar to the Trap algorithm, we demonstrated the computational costs of the Search
algorithm by varying the value of R ∈ [1, 50] and the results are shown in Figure 6(b). The ABKS-UR
scheme must perform |N | exponentiation operations for each query, whereas our scheme only needs to
conduct R exponentiation operations. The computational costs incurred by our scheme with the Search
algorithm increased almost linearly with respect to R, whereas those of ABKS-UR scheme remained
about the same, but our scheme was still much more efficient than the ABKS-UR scheme in terms of the
ciphertext search time. For example, with R = 50, |N | = 100, the ABKS-UR scheme required 537 ms
and our scheme needed 289 ms.
The ABKS-UR scheme cannot accurately verify the correctness of search results because of the high
number of false positives generated by the inherent defects of bloom filter, so we only show the results
verification time for our scheme with the Verify algorithm in Figure 7. The computational costs of
Verify algorithm increased with the number of search results (#C′w′ ∈ [1, 100]), which is consistent with
the theoretical study in Table 3. In particular, when #C′w′ = 100, the verification process only required
1445 ms. In addition, the process is conducted mainly by the PAS, which can provide a powerful
computing capacity. Thus, the results verification operation will not impose a great computational
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Figure 7 Verify algorithm.
burden on DUs, especially for the computation and bandwidth resource-limited DUs, such as sensor
nodes and mobile terminals.
According to the results presented above, the performance evaluation based on a real-world dataset
agreed completely with the computational complexity shown in Table 3. Compared with the state-of-
the-art ABKS-UR scheme, we verified that our scheme is more efficient and feasible in practice.
7 Conclusion
In this study, for a challenging multi-owner setting, we proposed an efficient and feasible results verification
scheme that allows DU to issue search queries and that also guarantees the accuracy of the search results
simultaneously. The formal security analysis demonstrated that our scheme is secure against IND-CKA
under a random oracle model. In addition, the results verification time is independent of the number
of DOs, and our experimental results over real-world dataset demonstrated the practical efficiency and
feasibility of our scheme.
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